and repair, of an identified energy, water conservation, or wastewater treatment measure or series of measures at one or more locations; or

"(B) energy savings through the construction and operation of one or more buildings or facilities to replace one or more existing buildings or facilities.".

(c) ENERGY OR WATER CONSERVATION MEAS-URE.—Section 804(4) of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 8287c(4)) is amended to read a follows:

"The term 'energy or water conservation measure' means—

"(A) an energy conservation measure, as defined in section 551(4) (42 U.S.C. 8259(4)); or

defined in section 551(4) (42 U.S.C. 8259(4)); or "(B) a water conservation measure that improves the efficiency of water use, is life cycle cost effective, and involves water conservation, water recycling or reuse, improvements in operation or maintenance efficiencies, retrofit activities or other related activities, not affecting the power generating operations at a Federally-owned hydroelectric dam"

SEC. 08. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect upon the date of enactment of this title.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, for clarification, this modification merely changes the effective date of the amendment. The amendment I offered will raise the amount authorized to be appropriated by this Congress for weatherization programs and for lowincome home energy assistance programs. Those are programs that help individuals and families around this country who are faced with rising and enormously increased natural gas bills and electricity bills and those who will be faced with substantial increases in those utility bills this summer for airconditioning purposes.

It is important that we increase this authorization level and that we do so right away. It is also important that we appropriate money quickly. I am hoping we will see progress on that front, working with the administration in the next few weeks. I am certainly going to be urging the President and those in the Department of Energy to strongly support an appropriation in this area.

This is an important thing to do. This is not a substitute for a comprehensive energy bill by any means. Senator Murkowski has introduced a comprehensive bill. I am working on developing a bill that is also much more broad in its reach and deals with the long-term energy needs of the country. This merely tries to deal with the immediate crisis.

It is very important we do this. I am very pleased all Senators have indicated support for this measure.

I yield the floor. I know Senator MURKOWSKI wishes to speak on this same subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. I join Senator BINGAMAN in urging support of the Bingaman amendment. It is cleared, as he indicated, on our

side. I remind my colleagues that energy affects America's families and businesses. We are seeing higher energy costs, lost jobs, and reduced prosperity. We know, as Senator BINGAMAN indicated, that the amendment cannot replace the need for a comprehensive energy policy.

We have a crisis in this country. We are addressing the symptoms and not the causes. That is easier said than done. We are going to have to get into those causes. We certainly agree we need to provide additional funds for the weatherization assistance and the LIHEAP program.

As you might know, Mr. President, these programs are in title VI of the Murkowski-Breaux National Energy Security Act of 2001. Let me explain briefly the difference because we are very close.

As Senator BINGAMAN knows, we are going to be holding hearings on these matters beginning next week. We will hold a hearing each week.

On LIHEAP, we have proposed an increased base from \$2 billion to \$3 billion and an increase in emergency funds from \$600 million to \$1 billion. The Bingaman amendment increases the base from \$2 billion to \$3.4 billion, so there is an increase. However, there are no emergency funds.

In weatherization, Senator BINGA-MAN's proposal and our proposal in title VI increases to \$500 million by the year 2005. In weatherization State energy programs, we propose an increase of \$125 million by 2005, and it is my understanding the Bingaman amendment proposes \$75 million by 2005. We have set State energy efficiency goals to reduce energy use by 25 percent by 2010, compared to 1990 levels, and we encourage State and regional energy planning to go ahead.

I remind everyone, while we need immediate relief until we get an energy plan passed in its entirety that addresses supply and conservation, we are not going to have the immediate relief we would like. We only increase authorizations by this in a sense. It is better to address these programs, along with the other energy needs, through the comprehensive approach which I think is an obligation of the Energy Committee which we collectively work toward. A piecemeal approach to energy policy hasn't gotten us anywhere and that is part of the problem of where we are today.

My point is, for example, what are we going to do this summer when gasoline supplies run short, as they are expected to do, and the consumers pay up to \$2 per gallon? Will we take the opportunity now to address the need for refining capacity in a comprehensive bill while we have the opportunity? Or will we avoid the tough political expensive decisions and instead come back here at a later time and increase LIHEAP yet again?

I think the time has come to make those tough decisions. I look forward to working with my colleague. We want to find a solution to add fuel to the tank of our economic engine now that it is running almost on empty. We will have to enact this year a comprehensive national energy policy. Otherwise, we will be forever chasing high energy prices with yet more temporary funds and placing the economic health and the national security of the country at risk.

Just as we can and need to get our way out of this energy crisis, we cannot buy our way out. The energy crisis, as we know, will not go away until we make the tough decisions that are needed to increase the supply of conventional fuels and improve our energy efficiency and conservation and expand the use of alternative fuel and renewables.

I congratulate Senator BINGAMAN and would like to be added as a cosponsor to his legislation.

I again reemphasize the reality that the American people expect us to address this crisis that impacts every American family. This amendment does not solve the underlying problem we face. We should and must address the illness, not the symptoms.

We must develop a comprehensive national energy strategy; again, one that ensures clean, secure, and affordable energy supply into the next decade.

I look forward to working with my colleague and others to develop this comprehensive energy strategy.

I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding there is no further debate, this is accepted, and we can vote now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment, No. 28, as modified.

The amendment (No. 28), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. KERRY. I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

NORTH KOREA

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I was briefly downstairs in a meeting with President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea. I will take a few moments to share with my colleagues some thoughts about our policy with respect to North Korea, which obviously has

profound implications for the region, as well as for the United States.

Mr. President, one of the major questions facing the United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies is how to deal with the ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. Pyongvang has already demonstrated its capacity to launch a 500 kilogram warhead to a range of at least 1000 kilometers. The failed test of the Taepo Dong-2 missile in August 1999 clearly shows North Korea's interest in developing a longer range missile capability. North Korea's proliferation of missiles, missile components, technology and training to states such as Pakistan and Iran further magnifies the need to get Pyongyang to end its missile program.

The Clinton administration left a framework on the table which could, if pursued aggressively by the Bush administration, go a long way toward reducing the threat posed by North Korean missiles and missile exports. Our South Korean allies clearly want us to continue the discussions that the Clinton administration began with North Korea on the missile question. Two days ago Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the Bush administration would "pick up" where the Clinton administration left off. Apparently not. Yesterday, President Bush told visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung that the administration would not resume missile talks with North Korea any time soon. I believe this is a serious mistake in judgment. I will suggest whv.

Our South Korean allies are on the front line; they are under no illusions about the regime in North Korea or its leader Kim Jong I. President Kim firmly believes that Washington and Seoul must continue their efforts to open up North Korea, and that the United States should move quickly to resume the missile talks. We should listen to him carefully. I and others raised this issue with Secretary Powell earlier today, when he testified before the Foreign Relations Committee. The Secretary indicated that some of the things put on the table by the Clinton administration are "promising" but that monitoring and verification "are not there." He said that the Bush administration intended to do a comprehensive policy review and then would decide when and how to engage North Korea.

I don't think any of us in the Senate would second-guess the right or even the good sense of a new administration conducting a thorough review of a particular area of the world or a particular policy. That makes sense. However, I am deeply concerned that by sending the message we will not even engage in a continuation of talks where the Clinton administration left off, that we wind up potentially offering an opportunity to see a window closed or for people to misinterpret the

long-term intentions of the United ministration and others as a major rea-States and perhaps make it more difficult to pick up where the Clinton administration left off when and if the administration resumes. ministration and others as a major reason why the United States needs to move more rapidly with the National Missile Defense System. Given that, I am somewhat confused by the adminis-

We need to reflect on the fact that North Korea took some remarkable steps, heretofore unimaginable steps, and under the 1994 agreed framework, North Korea set about to freeze its existing nuclear energy program under the IAEA supervision to permit special inspections to determine the past operating history of its reactor program just prior to the delivery of key components of light-water reactors.

A few years ago when the United States was concerned that North Korea was violating the agreed framework by possibly building a new reactor in an underground site at Kumchangi-ri, North Korea ultimately allowed a team of Americans to inspect the site, first in May of 1999 and each year thereafter.

This showed, clearly, that monitoring and verification agreements can be negotiated with North Korea. By the 11th hour of the Clinton administration, the United States and North Korea were discussing further proposals that would, indeed, prevent North Korea from developing missiles capable of striking the United States and bring a halt to North Korea's lucrative missile exports.

In my view, at this moment, now, we should still be encouraging progress in those particular areas. We should be particularly encouraging Pyongyang to continue down that path, not sending them a message that may, in fact, make it months later and far more difficult before we can do so. Delaying missile talks will not enhance the security of the United States or of the region about which we care. In fact, delay, coupled at this morning's hearing with Secretary Powell's somewhat lukewarm endorsement of the agreed framework could send a very negative signal about the nature and direction of United States policy toward North Korea.

The Clinton administration, in many people's judgment, may well have moved faster than some believed was prudent. But the reality is that negotiations have begun and proposals are on the table for discussion. Nothing has been agreed upon yet. There is no reason this administration could not pick up where the Clinton administration left off, even as it makes the decision to review and discuss alternative proposals. Nothing will preclude them from ensuring adequate monitoring and verification.

The issue of North Korea's missile capability is fundamental not only to security on the Korean peninsula but also to our own long-term security and also to the debate on national missile defense. The North Korean missile threat has been offered by the Bush ad-

son why the United States needs to move more rapidly with the National Missile Defense System. Given that, I am somewhat confused by the administration's go-slow approach on the missile talks with Pyongyang. If we can reduce or eliminate the threat posed by North Korea's missile program, not only to us but to others, we are going to be on a very different playing field. We will have greater security, on the one hand, and we will be able to look at other national missile defense options that may be less costly and less damaging to the arms control regime established by the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. With all of this in the balance, it seems to me that there is little to lose—and potentially much to gain—by getting back to the table with Pyongyang and seeing where the negotiations go.

It is my hope that this administration will rapidly move to do so.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE LOCKBOX

Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to strongly support the Conrad amendment that is before us which would create a lockbox for Social Security and for Medicare.

As a member of the Budget Committee, I have watched and listened to the proposals of the administration as they relate not only to the tax cut before us but the spending priorities. I listened on the evening of the State of the Union to a variety of proposals, all of which sounded very good. In fact, in some cases sitting there knowing our fiscal constraints, it sounded too good to be true.

I find as a member of the Budget Committee looking at the details now that, in fact, it was too good to be true, and the budget that has been proposed proposes to use all of the Medicare trust fund and a portion of the Social Security trust fund in order to balance this budget. There is still a question about whether or not it adds up.

If we proceed as this body and the House of Representatives voted last year to protect Social Security and Medicare to keep it out of the revenue stream for spending proposals, if we support the lockbox notion, which I hope we will—again, it passed this body by 60 votes last year, and I am hopeful it will do the same this year—if we pull those dollars out and protect them as the people of the country expect us to do, not only the seniors but the baby boomers who will be retiring in large numbers beginning in about 11 years, and also my son and daughter who are young people, can look forward to the future expecting us to protect those funds. We find that the President's proposal for his tax cut takes up literally